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Re Municipal Spraying and Contracting Ltd: Building 
Contracts and Quantum Meruit Claims — Peter 
Kiewit Revisited
CASE SUMMARY
The petitioner contractor was engaged by the respondent govern­
ment to do road construction work. The parties differed as to whether 
certain work ordered by the respondent fell within the scope of ti e 
contractual obligations. Originally, the petitioner declined to do the work, 
but later it acceded to the demands of the respondent. Subsequently, the 
petitioner brought a claim for this work. The Supreme Court o f New­
foundland, Trial Division, held that the petitioner was entitled to recover 
on a quantum meruit basis for the work at issue. Where a party to a 
contract exacts performance which it has no contractual right to demand 
and which is rendered by reason of duress rather than as a compromise 
of an honest claim, the performing party is entitled to rem uneration for 
such performance on a quantum meruit basis. Re Municipal Spraying and 
Contracting Ltd. 1978, No. C.B. 71 (Unreported).
BACKGROUND
It is common for alterations, requiring extra work on the part of 
the performing party, i*-' be made to the particulars of work in a building 
contract. The contract will usually stipulate a method of valuation of any 
extra work as well as any reouirements precedent to recovery for the 
extra work such as an authorized certificate. The determination of the 
necessity o f any alterations is most often the responsibility o f a profes­
sional agent of the owner, i.e., an architect or engineer. A problem may 
arise when the parties disagree whether work ordered is within the 
purview of the contract and as a result authorization for extra-contractual 
recovery is refused. In an instance where the contract does not contain 
an arbitration clause or some provision by which the m atter can be 
suspended for future settlement, the situation becomes quite difficult. 
While the dilemma is essentially interpretive in nature, its legal solution 
goes beyond the mere establishment of the contractual obligations of the 
parties.
The matter o f interpretative disputes in the building contract situa­
tion was considered by the Supreme Court of Canada in Peter Kiewit 
Sons’ Co. of Canada Ltd. v. Eakins Co. L td .1 In that case, the dispute was 
focused upon a sub-contract which incorporated terms of the main
'[I960] SCR 361.
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contract giving the owner’s engineer the authority to order alterations in 
work. The engineer’s decision was final and his written order was a 
condition precedent to recovery for any extra work. Through an amend­
ment by the engineer to the plans, the sub-contractor was instructed to 
drive piles to a greater depth than it thought was required under the 
original agreement. It also requested the ‘over-driving’ to be treated as 
an ‘extra’ which would entitle recovery beyond the original contract price. 
The engineer refused the request, m aintaining the am endm ent was 
within the scope of the original contract. The main contractor felt bound 
by the engineer’s opinion. The sub-contractor completed the work in 
accordance with the amended plans and later brought a claim in the 
alternative for damages for breach o f contract or for compensation for 
the extra work on the basis of quantum meruit. At trial the action failed. 
On appeal, the British Columbia Court o f Appeal held the sub-contractor 
to be entitled to rem uneration for the whole job on a quantum meruit 
basis.
The Supreme Court o f Canada reversed the Court of Appeal deci­
sion and restored the trial judgment. The majority found there to be no 
grounds upon which the sub-contract could be held inapplicable to the 
work in question. There was no consent to such effect. In addition, there 
was no supervening event or fundamental change in circumstance which 
would render performance impossible o r radically different so as to 
justify an inference o f frustration. Hence there could be no basis for the 
application of quasi-contract, and as a result any obligation to pay on the 
part of the main contractor had to be embodied in the sub-contract. In 
the opinion of the majority, the sub-contractor ought to have refused to 
complete the extra work. If performance without such completion was 
rejected, it ought then to have claimed damages for wrongful repudiation 
by the main contractor. The reasoning for such an approach was made 
clear:
In the absence o f  a clause in the contract enabling it (sub-contractor) to leave 
the matter in abeyance for further determ ination, it cannot go on with 
performance o f the contract according to the other party’s interpretation and 
then impose liability on a different contract. Having elected to perform in 
these circumstances, its recovery for this performance must be accordance 
with the terms o f the contract.2
The dissent of Cartwright, J. turned upon a different characteriza­
tion of the situation. He found that the work in question was not within 
the ambit o f the contract3 and was performed, under protest, in circum­
stances of practical compulsion. On the basis of these determinations, he 
found the approach of the majority to be inappropriate:
1I b i d per Judson, J. at p. 367.
3lbid., The majority found it unnecessary to determine whether the work in question was outside the 
contract. 1'heir analysis of the facts dealt with the question of whether an obligation to pay for the work 
could be founded outside the contract, see pp. 366-69.
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To say that because in such circumstances the respondent (sub-contractor) was 
not prepared to stop work and so risk the ruinous loss which would have 
fallen on it if its view of the meaning of the contract turned out to be 
erroneous, the appellant (main contractor) may retain the benefit of all the 
additional work done by the respondent without paying for it would be to 
countenance an unjust enrichment of a shocking character.. .  .*
To avoid such an occurrence, Cartwright, J. thought it proper that an 
obligation be implied on the part of the main contractor to pay for the 
additional work which it ordered and from which it derived a benefit.
The Kiewit decision has found application in a variety o f building 
contract cases. A delay which effectively transformed a summer project 
into a more costly winter project was held not to be a frustrating event 
which would bring performance outside an existing contract so as to 
provide the basis for a claim in quantum meruit.5 In a case of a funda­
mental breach by an employer, it was decided that a contractor’s failure 
to repudiate the contract limited his right to damages to the contract.6 
W here a dispute as to contractual terms arose during a construction 
project, it was held that the facts and terms of the contract, being not 
unlike those in Kiewit, bound the trial judge to allow the contractor no 
recovery beyond the contract.7
As a general proposition, benefits conferred under duress are re­
coverable, whether in the form of money, chattels or services.8 In a 
leading Canadian authority on the point,9 a vendor demanded that a 
purchaser pay more than the contract price for the transfer of certain 
lands. The purchaser who had entered into a binding agreement with 
another party in respect of the same lands was forced to pay the extra 
sum to protect his rights and to secure good title. The Supreme Court 
o f Canada, relying on English authorities,10 held, the vendor’s belief that
*lbid., p. 38«.
Swanson Construction Co. Ltd. v. Government of Manitoba (1963), 40 DLR (2d) 162 (Man. C.A.). See also 
Electric Power Equipment Ltd. v. RCA Victor Co. Ltd. (1963), 41 DLR (2d) 727 (B.C.S.C.).
*Morison-Knudsen Co. Inc. et al. v. British Columbia Hydro and Power Authority (No. 2), [1978] 4 W.W.R. 
193 (B.C.C.A.). The contractor in this case did not become aware of the employer's fundamental breach 
until after performance was complete and therefore never had an opportunity to repudiate the contract. 
The lack of an effective election did not influence t!ie application of Kiewit by the Court and the award 
of damages by the trial judge in quantum meruit was consequently varied.
7Modem Construction Ltd. et al. v. City of Moncton (1970), 2 N.B.R. (2d) 442 (N.B.S.C.Q.B.). See also 
Warren General Contracting Ltd. v. A.C. Mallet and Fils Ltee, et. al. (1979), 27 N.B.R. (2d) 425 (N.B.C.A.) 
and Industrial Construction v. Lake Side Center (1978), 20 N.B.R. (2d) 321 (N.B.S.C.Q.B.). In the later 
case Stratton J. found Kiewit to be senior authority “which appears to require the strict interpretation 
of contract documents and stric t adherence to contractual obligations", p. 324.
*Goff. R.; Jones. Cl. The Law of Restitution (2nd ed.) London: Sweet He Maxwell 1978, pp. 161-163.
*Knutson v. The Bourkes Syndicate, [ 1941J S.C.R. 419.
' “T he most recent o f the English authorities considered was Maskell v. Homer (1915) 3 K.B. 106 which 
contains a good summation of the English law with respect to duress and submission to honest claims.
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he was entitled to the additional money did not alter the fact that he was 
not so entitled. T he position o f practical compulsion, in which the 
vendor’s demands placed the purchaser, was sufficient to allow the latter 
to recover the extra amount.
A further decision of the Supreme Court of Canada11 clarified the 
meaning of “practical compulsion”. A municipality demanded certain fees 
from a hospitalized landowner pursuant to a by-law which was later 
quashed. In an action to recover the fees, it was held that when alleging 
practical compulsion, it is not essential to show there was no other 
alternative. It is enough to show that by reason of time or feasibility, 
other alternatives were impossible as a matter of practicality and that the 
circumstances resulted in a compulsion of an urgent and pressing neces­
sity.
THE PRINCIPAL CASE
In the instant case, the contractual work yielded about 80,000 yards 
of excess excavated materials. The employer instructed the contractor to 
use these materials for further construction which the employer con­
tended was part of the contract work. The contractor disagreed, but 
complied with the instructions because of the employer's threat to have 
the work done by another company, the cost of which it would later 
claim from the contractor. In addition, the contractor received legal 
advice to the effect that it should perform. The work in dispute, by the 
trial judge’s calculation, was an increase in the original contract o f almost 
70%. At no time during the contractor’s performance was the contract 
between the parties repudiated.
Goodridge, J. found that despite the similarities between the case 
before him and Kiewit, the situations were “on proper analysis quite 
different”.12 The protest in Kiewit arose only after the sub-contractor 
encountered difficulty in complying with the new specifications whereas, 
in the instant case, the protest commenced when the contractor became 
aware of the directions to do the work in issue. It was found to be of 
significance that the work in question was not covered by the contract.13 
The dilemma facing the contractor in Re Municipal Spraying was held to
11Eadie v. Township oj Brantford, [1967] S.C.R. 573 see also Munic tpality of Sarnt John, et al. v. Fraser Brace 
Overseas Corp., (1958] S.C.R. 263 and George (Porky) Jacobs Enterprises iJd. v. City of Regina, [1964] S.C.R 
326.
■*1978 No. C.B. 71 (Unreported) p. 16.
‘*This distinction may be tenuous inasmuch as the question of whether the work in issue was within the 
contractual obligations was not critical to the majority judgment in Kiewit. See footnote 3.
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be different from that facing the sub-contractor in Kiewit in respect of 
the decision whether to perform or not.14 In assessing that difference 
Goodridge, J. asserted:
If an owner insists that a contractor do an act not clearly within its contract, 
and there is thereby imposed upon the contractor the necessity o f making a 
decision, the prudent course for him to follow is to do the act and seek redress 
later. The owner is not adversely affected by either performance or non­
performance. The contractor is adversely affected both by performance when 
it could not be lawfully imposed and non-performance where performance 
could not be lawfully withheld.15
The trial judge held that Kiewit was distinguishable on the facts. 
Therefore, he did not feel bound to find the contractor’s performance 
had limited its recovery to the contract.16 Consequently, the case was 
characterized as one of unjust enrichment. The duress which motivated 
the contractor’s performance was held to be sufficient to negate any 
inference of volition. Since performance was involuntary, it could not 
constitute a submission to or compromise of the employer’s honest claim 
so as to disentitle the contractor to quasi-contractual relief.17 Recovery 
was awarded on a quantum meruit basis.
ANALYSIS
The statement of Goodridge J., with respect to the prudent course 
of action of a contractor in a position comparable to the one under 
study, is a contradiction of the remedy proposed by the majority in 
Kiewit. While the distinction between the positions of the contractor in 
the instant case and the sub-contractor in Kiewit is not entirely convincing, 
the approach is attractive. The treatm ent of the relevant considerations 
in the instant case is well reasoned and highlights the deficiencies of the 
Kiewit ratio in a general application to problems of this sort.18 Clearly, 
the latter does not lend itself to an equitable analysis of situations in
l4T he position o f the respective parties was distinguished on the basis that in the instant case the work 
concerned was not covered by the contract, hence the contractor had the option of performing and 
suing “to recover its costs and a reasonable profit", p. 17. T he relevance of the distinction may be 
questionable in light o f the nature o f the Kiewit analysis. See footnote 13.
‘*1978 No. C.B. 71 (Unreported) pp. 18-19.
l8In finding the contractor was not limited only to recovery on the contract, the Court found portions 
o f the judgm ent of Cartwright J. in Kiewit to be "a refreshing observation applicable to this case if not 
to that", p. 20.
l7T he Court found authority for this proposition in the English Court of Appeal decision in Maskell v. 
Homer (1915) 3 K.B. 106.
‘"See Duncan Wallace, in Hudson's Building and Engineering Contrails (10th ed.) London: Sweet 8c Maxwell 
1970 p. 543 where the author indicates that the decision in Kiewit is probably right inasmuch as the 
severe variation clause incorporated in the sub-contract made the engineer’s decision final. It was harsh 
in that if there had been good grounds for dispute, the sub-contractor was forced to elect before 
performance and run the risk of being wrong.
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which duress or extra-contractual work are of significance. The potential 
“unjust enrichment of a shocking character”, which Cartwright J. feared 
the majority decision in Kiewit might countenance in certain circumstan­
ces, can be readily perceived in the factual situation in Re Municipal 
Spraying.
Notwithstanding that it was distinguished upon the facts, the basic 
relevant principle underlying Kiewit is addressed in the judgm ent of 
Goodridge, J . In a situation where the interpretation of the contract is 
disputed, the inference that a contractor’s performance is a submission 
to the interpretation of the owner or employer is the foundation of the 
proposition in Kiewit that performance is a bar to recovery beyond the 
contract. It was acknowledged in Re Municipal Spraying that submission 
to ano ther’s honest claim is a bar to recovery in quasi-contract. In 
deciding that the contractor’s performance was not tantamount to such a 
submission, the Court effectively considered the same issue as in Kiewit 
but outside the frame of reference of the Kiewit decision.
If Re Municipal Spraying is rightly decided, it may provide recourse 
to a contractor which performs in the midst of an interpretive dispute. 
It would seem incumbent upon a contractor or sub-contractor which 
wishes to preserve an opportunity to contest, after performance, whether 
work is within the ambit of contractual obligations, to fulfill certain 
conditions. Firstly, the contractor would need to have drawn to the atten­
tion o f its employer before the work in question was commenced, that 
the interpretation was disputed and to have maintained that position 
throughout performance. Secondly, the contractor would have to be able 
to establish that it had rendered performance by reason of duress. 
W hether ‘practical compulsion’ would satisfy the duress requirement is 
not clear in the ratio of the instant case. However, the authorities seem 
to substantiate such an inference. If a contractor is able to meet these 
requirem ents, then it would at least have an arguable case for the 
application o f Re Municipal Spraying to its situation.
CONCLUSIONS
It is a trite observation that the Kiewit decision remains an influential 
authority in the law of building contracts; however, the parameters of 
that authoritative influence are quite obscure. While the instant case may 
delineate these parameters to a degree, it clearly indicates that in future 
considerations of the issue of performance and interpretive disputes in 
the building contract sphere, some emphasis needs to be placed on the 
voluntary aspect of the contractor’s actions. Developments in the law with 
respect to duress, particularly under the epithet of ‘practical compulsion’, 
add merit to such a focus. Inasmuch as Re Municipal Spraying draws
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attention to the inadequacies of an established precedent in application 
to a somewhat complex problem and provides direction for future con­
sideration of that problem, it is a decision o f value. Should its reasoning 
be judicially accepted as legally sound in the analysis o f the problem 
under study, then it may well be a landmark decision.
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